

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI				
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16	C/ACIS		X		
17	D/SOVA		X		
18	NIO/SP		X		
19	NIO/USSR		X		
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Remarks


3637 (10-81)

Executive Secretary
4 Nov 85

Date

STAT

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510



October 29, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We recently requested that you include on the Geneva Summit agenda the 32 Soviet SALT violations which you have officially confirmed to the U.S. Congress. Thus we are very pleased that you have responded by stating at the UN:

We feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we believe are their violations of a number of the provisions in all these agreements...

In our judgment, no new U.S.-Soviet arms control treaty can receive the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate for ratification until the Soviets reverse this pattern of "break-out" from arms control. We believe that a Summit confrontation on all Soviet violations of existing treaties is absolutely essential to preserve the credibility and prospects for improving international security through arms control.

But in addition to the 32 you have officially certified, we believe that new revelations on the eve of the Summit will require us to face the fact of five dangerous new Soviet SALT violations.

Secretary Weinberger has just confirmed that the Soviets have deployed a mobile SS-25 "second new type" ICBM forbidden in the SALT II agreement. This violation implies other developments which trigger at least four more violations, for a total of five (explained in detail in the attached Annex):

1. Credible press reports indicate that there are 45 mobile launchers for these forbidden SS-25s already deployed, with indications from new construction that upwards of 200 will ultimately be deployed. This indicates that the Soviets may already be exceeding the 2,504 number of missiles and



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Annex: Analysis of New Soviet SALT Violations

As you know, nine of us sent letters to you on September 9 and October 4, 1985, requesting that you confront Soviet leader Gorbachev with the 32 Presidentially confirmed Soviet SALT Break Out violations at the November 19-20 1985 Geneva Summit meeting. A new and authoritative poll indicates that two thirds of the American People agree with you that the Soviets are violating all the existing arms control treaties, so your concerns about Soviet cheating are supported by a solid majority. Americans should be encouraged by your recent statement to the United Nations General Assembly on October 24, confirming the inclusion of our request as part of the agenda for the impending Summit:

"... We feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we believe are their violations of a number of the provisions in all these agreements ..." [The agreements you specifically cited as being violated were the "ban on biological and toxin weapons, the 1975 Helsinki accords on human rights and freedoms," and the SALT I Agreement-Treaty and SALT II Treaty "on strategic weapons."]

Americans will also be encouraged by Defense Secretary Weinberger's recent statement:

"... I'm sure the President will raise these violations [at the Summit] because they are very relevant to any agreement that is signed in the future ... I'm quite sure he will make the points again ..." (Interview with Allan Ryskind, Human Events, October 26, 1985)

The Soviets are understandably quite sensitive to our widely shared concerns about their expanding pattern of arms control Break Out violations. Soviet news agency TASS severely attacked our letters on October 9. Obviously, no new U.S. - Soviet arms control treaty can receive the advice and consent of two thirds of the Senate, for you to ratify it, until the Soviets reverse their Break Out Violations of existing SALT treaties. A Summit confrontation on all their violations is absolutely essential to preserve the prospects for improving international security through arms control.

Dangerous New Soviet SALT Violations On The Eve of The Summit

But ominously, Mr. President, on the very eve of the Summit, several new Soviet SALT violations have been revealed which cast a dark shadow over the prospects for world peace through arms control. We are alarmed by Defense Secretary Weinberger's recent confirmation on October 22 that the Soviet Union has now

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bombers they had when SALT II was signed in 1979, and are grossly exceeding the 2,250 SALT II ceiling.

2. Since these 45 SS-25s are capable of carrying MIRV warheads, it appears that the Soviets must be in violation of the most important SALT II ceiling limiting MIRVed ICBM launchers to 820.

3. Moreover, the deployment of the SS-25s defeats the object and purpose of the indefinitely-extended SALT I Interim Agreement.

4. Finally, the deployment of SS-25s supported from old SS-7 ICBM facilities violates the SALT I ICBM dismantling procedures.

We note that this action of the Soviets, and the violations that are implied by the action, constitute an attempt by the Soviets to increase tensions. Perhaps this is what the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev meant when he described the international situation as "explosive" and threatened the United States with "rough times" ahead.

We request that you include these five new violations in the forthcoming report which you have mandated, namely, the "Response to Soviet Violations Paper," known as the RSVP report and scheduled for release on November 15.

Finally, Mr. President, we urge you to raise them with the Soviets at the Summit. We urge you to raise them with the American people. We believe that the American people support a proportionate response to actions which break out of the arms control process. We suggest that the appropriate forum to explain this problem would be a Joint Session of Congress, televised to the nation and the whole world by satellite.

Respectfully,

James H. Holmes
Steve Symms
James G. Mc Clellan

operationally deployed its mobile SS-25 second "new type" ICBM (Soviet SS-25 deployment directly violates SALT II's Article IV Paragraph 9 prohibition on deploying more than one "new type" ICBM, while flight-testing and constructing fixed and mobile deployed launchers for their second new type SS-24 ICBM. Previously, you have confirmed to Congress that Soviet flight-testing of the SS-25 was a clearcut, "irreversible" SALT II violation, because SALT II Article IV Paragraph 9 bans the flight-testing of more than one "new type" ICBM. Moreover, you have already confirmed that the SS-25's covert MIRV capability and the full encryption of its flight-test telemetry were also clearcut, unqualified Soviet SALT II violations.)

The timing of the confirmed SS-25 deployment banned by SALT II coming just before the Summit, has dangerous implications for American national security, especially when Soviet leader Gorbachev is describing the international situation as "explosive" and threatening "rough times" ahead for the U.S. if we do not knuckle under to Soviet demands, as State Department accommodationists are urging.

We therefore request that you officially confirm in public for the benefit of the Congress and the American People, on an urgent basis before the Summit, the following further Soviet violations which we believe result directly from the now confirmed Soviet SS-25 deployment banned by SALT II. These direct results of SS-25 deployment entail over four even more serious Soviet violations of both SALT I and II:

Two More New Soviet SALT II Violations

1. Credible press reports indicate that the Soviets have recently deployed over 48 mobile ICBM launchers, which exceed even the 2,504 number of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) which they deceptively claimed to have when the SALT II Treaty was signed in June, 1979. Moreover, over 20 bases for the mobile SS-25 are reportedly under construction, indicating an eventual SS-25 force of well over 200 mobile launchers.

There was no agreed Soviet ceiling of 2,504 SNDVs in the SALT II Treaty. The agreed SNDV ceiling, to be common to both sides, was 2,250. But in June 1982, your State Department secretly "agreed" with the Soviets that their forces could be "capped" at their claimed higher, June 1979 level of 2,504, without, however, the U.S. having the right to the same number. As you recall, the original SALT II Treaty was already unequal, unbalanced, destabilizing, and not in the U.S. national security interest, in the opinion of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In 1980, you termed SALT II "fatally flawed" and "illegal" because it was "unequal." But the State Department's 1982 secret agreement

concession converted SALT II into an even more unequal treaty than before. This explicit U.S. agreement to unequal levels also was inconsistent with the 1972 Jackson Amendment to SALT I, requiring equal levels of forces in SALT II, and because it secretly constrained U.S. forces by Executive Agreement alone, we believe it also was inconsistent with the Treaty-making power of the Constitution and contrary to Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Therefore, the recently confirmed deployment of over 48 SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers, together with indications of an intended force of over 200 SS-25s totally banned by SALT II, reveals that the Soviets are now grossly exceeding even this 2,504 deceptive, concessionary, unequal ceiling. Moreover, their 50 plus new Bear H Bombers, their 300 plus intercontinental Backfire bombers, and of course their 200 illegally deployed mobile SS-16 ICBMs, which they failed to acknowledge in the June 1979 SALT II Data Exchange, also grossly exceed this ceiling.

2. Confirmed Soviet deployment of over 48 mobile SS-25 ICBM launchers also violates the most important SALT II ceiling, the limit of 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers. This is because you have already confirmed to Congress that the SS-25 has a covert MIRV capability, and the Soviets already have 818 MIRVed SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 silo launchers. Given the Soviet history of deception and cheating, we must consider a covert MIRV capability to be exploited operationally, (The National Intelligence Estimate for this year reportedly concludes that the Soviets have done this with their superheavy SS-18 ICBM, deploying 14 MIRV warheads on each one when SALT II allows only 10, another serious SALT II violation, by the way.) Thus Soviet deployment of any more than only 2 covertly MIRV-capable SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers violates the crucial SALT II ceiling on MIRVed ICBMs, which are the most dangerous weapons in the world. In December, 1983, the Soviets reportedly told the U.S. that they intended to violate this key ceiling, along with the related ceilings on MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs and bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. Now they have grossly violated these ceilings.

Mr. President, we hope that these three serious new Soviet SALT II violations will finally convince the State Department to allow the unratified SALT II Treaty to expire in December under its own terms, so that we will not have to dismantle after all the first perfectly good Poseidon submarine, now scheduled to be cut up on November 28, after the Summit. As you are aware, we may have to pursue Constitutional, legal, and legislative remedies against the State Department if U.S. compliance with the unequal, unratified SALT II Treaty continues past December.

Two More New Soviet SALT I Violations

3. In May, 1972, the U.S. warned in Unilateral Statement B to the SALT I Interim Agreement that Soviet deployment of mobile ICBMs would be "inconsistent with the objectives" of SALT I. The SALT I Interim Agreement was jointly extended indefinitely by the U.S. and the USSR in October, 1977, by parallel statements. (This extension was approved by Congress, but with the McClure caveat that no U.S. strategic force options for research and development should be constrained.) The 1972 U.S. Unilateral Statement thus warned the Soviets that the U.S. would consider that mobile ICBM deployment would defeat the object and purpose of the Agreement. Mobile SS-25 deployment must therefore be regarded as defeating the object and purpose of SALT I, and thus can also be considered a serious violation.

4. Your Presidential Report to Congress of February 1, 1985 stated that Soviet deployment of mobile SS-25 ICBM launchers at old SS-7 complexes would be a "future violation" of the SALT I ICBM Dismantling Procedures agreed in July, 1974. The SS-25's now confirmed deployment therefore violates the SALT I Dismantling Procedures, because the SS-25s are reportedly being supported from old SS-7 ICBM support facilities at the Yurya and Yoshkar-Ola old SS-7 complexes, which is directly prohibited by the Dismantling Procedures. Why should the U.S. dismantle Poseidon submarines, when the Soviets are violating the ICBM Dismantling Procedures?

Mr. President, these two new Soviet SALT I violations make it all the more imperative that you withdraw the erroneous statements from your June 10, 1985 Report to Congress inserted by the detentist "permanent government" State Department bureaucracy, saying that 'the Soviets have complied with the letter of SALT I and with its limits on ICBMs and SLBMs.' Not only did these erroneous statements contradict your own 1978 statement that the Soviets had repeatedly violated the "entire spirit and terms of SALT I," but they totally contradict our own 1980 and 1984 Republican Party Platform attacks on the "Carter cover-up of Soviet SALT-I violations." Moreover, your own arms control General Advisory Committee Report of October 1984 confirms three even more serious Soviet SALT I violations: heavy SS-19 ICBM deployment, exceeding SLBM ceilings, and deliberate camouflage and concealment.

Other Soviet Actions Increasing Nuclear War Risk

Finally, the Soviets are reportedly provocatively violating the 1971 Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, by:

- a) Electronically jamming U.S. strategic early warning detection systems;

- b) Failing to notify the U.S. of this prohibited jamming, as required; and
- c) Failing to notify the U.S. of the early April 1984 salvo launch of multiple Soviet SS-20s on a prohibited azimuth directly toward the U.S., as required.

Mr. President, these Soviet provocations, together with the Presidentially confirmed Soviet violations of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement ending the Cuban Missile Crisis, endanger U.S. national security by increasing the risk of nuclear war. We again warn you to be wary of Gorbachev's nuclear blackmail threats, playing upon understandable Western fears of nuclear war.

Conclusion: Necessity For Proportionate Responses

In conclusion, we await the Defense Department's Response to Soviet Violations Paper, due to you by November 15, because we need to make use of it in preparing our own study of proportionate responses to the Soviet SALT violations, which we intend to use for amendments to the proposed emergency FY 1986 Soviet Arms Control Compliance Supplemental Defense Authorization Request.

We believe that the State Department's unfounded restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty has crippled your own Strategic Defense Initiative, making \$26 billion for mere SDI research over 20 years a tragic waste of ever scarcer defense funds. Such an interpretation simply constitutes U.S. unilateral disarmament and appeasement. The State Department has already in effect traded away your SDI, even before the Summit, and for no quid pro quo at all in Soviet restraint. We do not support a double standard for the Soviet Union, allowing their SALT I and II Break Out Violations and massive strategic buildup, while the U.S. is enmeshed in the self-imposed strait-jacket of unilateral SALT compliance. Continued full U.S. compliance with the unequal SALT I Interim Agreement (originally intended for only five year's duration) and the unequal, unratified SALT II Treaty is unilateral disarmament and appeasement. A majority of the American People seem to agree that the U.S. should not comply with arms control treaties that the Soviets are violating. Proportionate responses to Soviet SALT violations have been overwhelmingly endorsed by Congress and the American People, and are necessary to preserve U.S. national security. The time for "going the extra mile" and for making a "fresh start" in U.S. - Soviet relations is unfortunately past, except in the unlikely event that the Soviets agree at the Summit to immediately reverse their SALT Break Out Violations. Our sworn Constitutional duty,

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like yours, is to preserve the "Common Defense" This requires proportionate responses supported by the American People.

We thank you for responding positively to our requests, and we remain your strong supporters, especially in these dangerous times of crisis Summitry with the Soviets.